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THE PERVASIVE PROBLEM OF COURT-
SANCTIONED SECRECY AND THE EXIGENCY
OF NATIONAL REFORM
DAVID S. SANSON
INTRODUCTION
Dangers to the public’s health and safety posed by protective
orders and secret settlements have long been discussed in the legal
literature,1 but in light of current events and the recent national
sensation over the amendment to South Carolina Local Rule 5.03,2
this topic is particularly prominent and relevant. Since 1938, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules) have given
individual judges the discretion to refuse a request to seal a record,3
but as a matter of course, especially when neither litigant objects,
courts blindly seal judicial records without regard to the public’s
interest in the information being sealed.4 As such, information
Copyright © 2003 by David S. Sanson.
1. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). In this
seminal and much-referenced article on secret settlements, Professor Fiss argues:
Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining: Consent is often coerced;
the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the absence of a trial and
judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although
dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a
capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised.
Id. at 1075; see also PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL 113–14 (1985) (describing the aftermath of early asbestos settlements).
2. S.C. LOC. R. 5.03(C). This rule preemptively prohibits the sealing of all court-filed
settlements.
3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing a broad list of factors by which courts may grant
motions for protective orders).
4. See Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 53,
58 (2000) (“Most agreements are uncontested, and crowded calendars put great pressure on
judges to move cases. As a result, judges routinely approve sealing and secrecy orders.
Settlement agreements are often filed under seal as a matter of course.”); see also Richard A.
Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You), 2 J.
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regarding public health and safety that could save lives regularly
remains hidden under the auspices of court-approved secrecy.5
This Note, then, with special reference to the recent controversy
over South Carolina Local Rule 5.03 (Local Rule 5.03),6 America’s
strictest antisecrecy law, examines the legitimacy of court-approved
secrecy in litigation and argues that courts should never seal any
record, including discovery material, that implicates public health and
safety. Part I outlines the ongoing debate in the popular press and
academic literature over secrecy in litigation. Part II discusses the
problems with prosecrecy arguments. Part III presents the most
significant state and federal laws that govern secrecy in litigation. Part
IV enumerates the shortcomings of current secrecy laws. Part V
argues that widespread reform is necessary and asserts that the
Federal Rules, along with parallel state laws, should be amended to
prohibit the sealing of any record or settlement agreement introduced
in court that reveals substantial injuries or substantial threats to the
public’s health and safety.
I.  THE SECRECY DEBATE
During the course of litigation, parties frequently ask courts to
seal records that contain potentially damaging or embarrassing
information. While courts sometimes reserve the right to publicize a
sealed record or settlement if the need arises,7 sealed records and
settlements normally remain permanently sequestered from all
nonparties.
The reasons parties seek protective orders are numerous. In a
personal injury suit, for example, a victim may want to safeguard his
or her medical records from public dissemination; in a divorce suit, a
party may wish to keep secret the details of his or her sexual history.
INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 123 (1999) (“Many judges, focused on encouraging
settlement, see secrecy as being the easiest path to that goal.”).
5. See infra notes 43–58 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 72–109 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 196 Cal. Rptr. 871, 877 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(“[A] sealing or confidentiality order in a civil case is always subject to continuing review and
modification, if not termination, upon changed circumstances.”); Panel IV: Secrecy and the
Courts: The Judges’ Perspective, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 169, 193 (2000) (statement of Judge Koeltl):
I have gotten into the habit of adding a clause at the bottom of each confidentiality
agreement providing that the court can change this confidentiality agreement at any
time. This serves to put the parties on notice that if at any time there is a reason to
change the agreement, whether it be because a third party comes in or there is some
other change in the case, the court reserves the right to do it.
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In suits involving business associations, which often attempt to settle
claims before verdict—thereby mitigating excessive litigation costs, a
potentially detrimental decision, and consumer scorn—corporate
entities routinely agree to settle claims with adverse litigants on the
condition that the court files the settlement under seal. Additionally,
intellectual property owners often request protective orders or a
sealing of the record to avoid the revelation of trade secrets. Because
the vast majority of judges, given their demanding schedules, are
loath to contradict the unified will of adverse parties and in so doing
extend the course of a lawsuit, courts regularly approve secret
settlements and grant protective orders without any inquiry into the
nature of the information being shielded from the public.8
In view of the lively and enduring controversy that surrounds
secrecy in litigation, before this Note can effectively analyze the
current rules and arguments regarding secrecy in the courts, it is
necessary to survey briefly the leading arguments concerning the
customary granting of protective orders and secret settlements.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Status Quo
A significant number of lawyers and scholars believe that secrecy
is vital to the fluidity and viability of the courts. This argument
emphasizes that without secrecy, the incentive to settle would
disappear.9 In turn, the argument contends that in this era of great
litigiousness, if the incentive to settle evaporates, the courts’ dockets
will be hopelessly overwhelmed.10 If this docket congestion occurs, the
argument proceeds, dangerous products will ironically find their way
onto the market because the courts will be too inundated with
8. Weinstein, supra note 4, at 58.
9. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 432 (1991) (asserting that restricting the discretion of the courts to keep
records confidential runs “counter to important procedural trends designed to enhance judicial
power to control discovery, improve efficiency, and promote settlement in the hope of reducing
cost and delay”). Contra Zitrin, supra note 4, at 117–19 (presenting and then repudiating the
popular belief that “without the ability to settle in a way that keeps damaging information from
public scrutiny, the incentive to settle would be lost”).
10. See Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2002, at A1 (reporting that opponents of the amendment to Local Rule 5.03 argue that
secrecy encourages settlements and thereby sustains the court’s limited resources). But see Paul
D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 955
(1996) (arguing that delay and docket congestion in the district courts is evident but not critical).
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lawsuits to deal with the most egregious threats to public health
and safety.11
Jurisprudentially, the prosecrecy argument insists that the
judicial system is a forum for private parties to resolve private
disputes and is not an instrument of social justice.12 This method of
reasoning, as represented most prominently by Professor Arthur
Miller, acknowledges the Supreme Court’s affirmation in Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc.13 of a common law right of access to
court proceedings, but suggests that this right of access “is not
absolute” and “has never been extended beyond the confines of the
courtroom and court documents.”14 In this sense, “the public has no
right to gather information by piggybacking on the discovery process
engaged in by private litigants.”15 This argument against antisecrecy
laws also points out that the mere use of governmental processes to
gather information does not necessarily “create a First Amendment
right of public access to” that information.16 If both parties are in
favor of sealing (or even if only one party is asking for secrecy), there
is no reason, some argue, for the court to frustrate the aims of the
litigants by unnecessarily delaying what is already likely to be a
complex and costly proceeding.17 In short, the prosecrecy argument
typically bases its logic on the premise that courts exist to assist
private litigants in resolving their disputes in the most efficient way
possible. It also emphasizes that the Supreme Court has never
11. See Richard A. Epstein, The Disclosure Dilemma: Why a Ban on Secret Legal
Settlements Does More Harm than Good, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2002 (Magazine), at D1
(contending that in light of a prohibition on court-approved secrecy in settlements, “[f]irms may
well hesitate to launch new products, leaving older and often more dangerous products to
dominate the market and cause injuries”).
12. Miller, supra note 9, at 441. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978) (arguing that courts are best suited to resolve
private disputes between private litigants).
13. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
14. See id. at 597 (“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.”
(footnote omitted)); Miller, supra note 9, at 428–29 (affirming this logic).
15. Id. at 441. Professor Epstein contends that under Local Rule 5.03, “information
obtained by one plaintiff will become readily available to others. This will reduce the cost of
filing lawsuits, and increase the number of ‘follow-on’ suits.” Epstein, supra note 11.
16. Miller, supra note 9, at 441.
17. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 11 (arguing that under Local Rule 5.03(C), “mandatory
settlement disclosure may make it harder for individual plaintiffs to get justice in a timely
manner” because “[d]efendants who fear follow-on litigation will likely seek to postpone
settlement in order to prevent the details of the case from becoming known”).
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extended its reasoning to hold that the public has a presumptive right
of access to all information that a party presents in court.
The argument for maintaining a system that customarily
authorizes sealed protective orders also points out that not allowing
secrecy can lead to the dissemination of embarrassing or financially
injurious information that has no bearing on public health and
safety.18 Litigants, the argument posits, do not abandon all notions of
privacy simply by entering the courtroom.19 Prohibiting the sealing of
some court records could reveal sensitive, confidential, and
humiliating information, all of which is rightly shielded from the
public domain by protective orders. The prosecrecy argument further
suggests that the integrity of the traditionally confidential
relationships between husbands and wives, teachers and students,
attorneys and clients, priests and parishioners, and doctors and
patients could be at risk if all court records were granted a
presumption of universal access.20 The justification for secret
settlements is also based on a perceived need for secrecy regarding
medical records, the names of rape and child molestation victims, and
sensitive financial data.21 One facet of the prosecrecy argument,
moreover, suggests that the assertion that protective orders routinely
conceal information regarding public health and safety is unfounded
and insists that such assertions are chiefly supported by
anecdotal evidence.22
18. See, e.g., Letter from Edward W. Mullins, Jr., Partner, Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, L.L.P., to The Honorable Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief Judge, United States
District Court of South Carolina 1 (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/
notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). In his letter to the court during the
public commentary period for Local Rule 5.03, Mullins wrote that because “[p]laintiffs,
defendants, and witnesses often are compelled to expose very personal, sensitive information in
court . . . . [D]isclosure of such information should not be required unless there is a balanced
consideration of the interests of privacy and property versus disclosure in a particular case on a
full record.” Id.
19. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 466 (“Litigants do not give up their privacy rights
simply because they have walked, voluntarily or involuntarily, through the courthouse door.”).
20. Id. at 474–75.
21. See, e.g., David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICS 125, 125–26 (1999) (arguing for “sunshine-in-litigation” legislation but
concurring that “there is a real worry about mere gossip, ‘infotainment’ that comes from prying
around in files,” and that “worry about embarrassment is a genuine one”).
22. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 478–80 (“The allegation that protective orders are
concealing information important to public health and safety obviously should arouse concern,
but its validity is doubtful.”).
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This aspect of the prosecrecy argument also stresses the need to
protect trade secrets and inchoate patents from the public domain.23 If
intellectual property is liberated from the confidential confines of
Pandora’s Box, this reasoning holds, numerous corporations will
suffer grave financial ruin, and the incentive to file frivolous, fishing-
expedition lawsuits against such corporations will increase
exponentially.24 “It is difficult to imagine,” writes Professor Miller,
“why the general public would have anything more than idle curiosity
in the dollar value of a settlement of a court dispute or its terms of
payment. These subjects have no relationship to a potential public
hazard or matters of public health.”25
B. Arguments in Favor of Change
Arguments in favor of a prohibition against sealing court records
flourish in myriad forms. Some arguments presuppose a presumption
of universal access to all judicial records.26 Other arguments hold that
sealing is inapposite when the public can demonstrate an interest in
the information in question.27 Still other arguments stand for the more
limited proposition that only those settlements filed with the court
that broach public health and safety issues should be prohibited from
sealing.28
In whatever form these arguments against secrecy in litigation
appear, advocates for greater access to court records tend to premise
their reasoning on the Supreme Court’s holding in Nixon and the
public’s presumptive right of access to judicial records.29 The public
may not have a right to all information that comes before a court, the
23. See id. at 467–74 (arguing that prohibiting secret settlement will flood the market with
trade secrets, increase unwarranted fears of defective products, stifle innovation, and encourage
frivolous lawsuits).
24. Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 11 (agreeing with the argument made by insurers and
businesses that Local Rule 5.03(C) goes too far in requiring mandatory disclosure and
encourages lawsuits by competitors seeking trade secret information).
25. Miller, supra note 9, at 484–85.
26. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 4, at 53 (“I start from the principle that everything in
court should be public and nothing secret except the internal chambers discussions by judges
with their clerks and various drafts of opinions.”).
27. See, e.g., Panel IV: Secrecy and the Courts: The Judges’ Perspective, supra note 7, at 196
(statement of Judge Scheindlin) (“I said, in that particular case and for that particular reason,
that the newcomer had the burden of showing the high level of need that would cause me to
overturn what the parties had relied on as a term of the settlement.”).
28. See, e.g., S.C. LOC. R. 5.03(C).
29. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
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argument typically admits, but it certainly has right of access to
information that implicates its health and safety.30 In turn,
constituents of the antisealing regime generally cite a long list of
settlements, especially the now-infamous Johns-Manville asbestos
settlement,31 the Agent Orange settlement,32 the recent
Firestone/Ford Explorer settlements,33 and the numerous Catholic
Church settlements,34 to argue that sealed documents, if they had
been subject to the sunshine of universal access, would have revealed
significant dangers to the public and saved countless lives.35
30. See, e.g., Letter from Rebecca E. Epstein, Staff Attorney, Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice, P.C., to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 1 (Sept. 19,
2002), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (“TLPJ [Trial Lawyers for Public Justice] supports the proposed amendment because it
would ensure that the public has access to important information about the judiciary. Sealed
settlements effectively censor such information, undermining the principles that lie at the core
of our democracy.”); cf. Miller, supra note 9, at 429 (emphasizing that the public’s presumptive
right of access to judicial records is not absolute).
31. See Epstein, supra note 11 (noting and rejecting the “common claim” that a secret
settlement of asbestos claims between manufacturer Johns-Manville and eleven of its employees
in 1933 kept the public ignorant about the dangers of asbestos for years).
32. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 143–48 (2d Cir. 1987)
(holding that, in light of a prior settlement by which the confidentiality of discovery material
was part of the settlement, the party that wanted to maintain the confidentiality of discovery
material had the burden of showing good cause in order to receive continued protection against
a third-party (the Vietnam Veterans of America) claim). For a discussion of this case, see Panel
IV: Secrecy and the Courts: The Judges’ Perspective, supra note 7, at 201–02.
33. See Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects Were Known in ‘96 but Not Reported, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2001, at A1 (describing the deadly relationship between Firestone tires and
Ford Explorer vehicles, which remained a secret buried in protective orders for several years).
34. See Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases; Settlements
Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (reporting that the
Archdiocese of Boston had “quietly settled child molestation claims against at least seventy
priests” within the last ten years).
35. Antisecrecy advocates also often cite the Zomax case, in which secret settlements
concealed that a drug caused twelve deaths and over 400 allergic reactions before it was
removed from the market, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device case, the Halcion Heart Valve
case, the General Motors gas tank litigation (famously involving Ralph Nader), and the Dow
Corning silicone breast implant case. For a discussion of these cases, see Zitrin, supra note 4, at
119–21; see also Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts:
Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643, 648–49 n.23 (1991) (“Hundreds
of smokers had Bic cigarette lighters blow up in their hands. One Pennsylvania woman was
burned over 70 percent of her body. Confidential settlements left scores of others unaware that
the lighters were defective.” (quoting Prepared Statement of Dianne Weaver Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1990))); Weinstein, supra note 4, at 64–65:
One of the earliest reported buyouts [by which lawyers received payments in return
for secret agreements not to engage in any further legal action] resulted from the
deaths of more than seven hundred workers from silicosis caused by the construction
of the Hawk’s Nest Tunnel in West Virginia in the early 1930s.
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Antisecrecy arguments also utilize analogies to various doctrines
of law to suggest that it is unethical and perhaps illegal for courts to
approve and seal settlements that reveal evidence of wrongdoing.
One commentator, for example, has recently suggested that
[a]greements to keep criminal or tortious conduct secret that are
made in connection with litigation share at least this much in
common with conspiracy: they make it more likely that the crime or
tort will go undetected, more likely, if you will, that the criminal or
tortfeasor will be successful.36
In this sense, the argument insists that if existing laws proscribe
certain activities, courts and lawyers who hide those illegal activities
under protective orders and secrecy agreements thereby collude in
the proliferation of lawsuits and the compounding of crime.37
Other arguments directly confront ethical questions facing
lawyers involved with secret settlements that may conceal public
health and safety information. Professor Richard Zitrin, for instance,
proposed an amendment to the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct that would have made it unethical for
a lawyer to participate in making an agreement that would restrict
public access to information that the lawyer believes concerns
substantial dangers to public health or safety.38 Such ethical
arguments attempt to shift the focus of the secrecy debate away from
courts and onto lawyers who, on behalf of their clients, instinctively
disregard public interest in the pursuit of a favorable outcome.39
Letter from The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, National Press Club, The
Radio-Television News Directors Association, and Society of Professional Journalists, to Larry
W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 4 (Sept. 27, 2002), available at
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(supporting Local Rule 5.03 by citing secret settlements involving asbestos, Dow Corning
silicone gel breast implants, the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, DES synthetic estrogen,
Firestone tires, Ford pickup trucks, General Motors trucks (with side-saddle gas tanks), the
Halcion anti-anxiety drug, the Miracle Recreation Merry-go-Round, the Pfizer heart valve,
Prozac, and Zomax).
      36.   Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery
Legal, Illegal, or Something In Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 801 (2002).
      37. See id. at 802.
38. Zitrin, supra note 4, at 116. According to Professor Koniak, the Ethics 2000
Commission rejected Zitrin’s model rule proposal “because it is legal for clients to enter such
agreements, it should be ethical for a lawyer to help the client with such an agreement by
drafting it and agreeing to abide by its terms.” Koniak, supra note 36, at 807.
39. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 4, at 123 (“If an ethical rule required that attorneys could no
longer put their clients’ interests ahead of the public health and safety in specific kinds of cases,
lawyers would be less likely to stipulate their way around ‘sunshine’ laws.”).
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Concentrating less on ethical or health and safety concerns per
se, the antisecrecy argument also criticizes secret settlements and
protective orders on jurisprudential grounds. Some academics, in fact,
have argued that too much settlement is poisonous to the judicial
system because settlements, like private dispute resolution decisions,
produce neither rules nor binding precedents on nonparties.40 In turn,
the argument proceeds, because “the discovery and publicizing of
facts . . . is a public good created by adjudication,”41 when such
discovery and publishing of facts is sealed, “the salience of
adjudication fades and the authority of courts weakens.”42
II.  THE PROBLEMS WITH PROSECRECY ARGUMENTS
As the United States has witnessed too many times this century,
deadly consequences ensue43 from regarding the judicial system as
nothing more than a forum for resolving private disputes.44 When a
litigant presents a record to the court, and especially when he or she
asks the court for a protective order of any kind, the litigant is
inevitably sacrificing at least a modicum of privacy.45 Indeed, when it
became clear that court documents which revealed the existence of
the fatal combination of Ford Explorers and Firestone tires were
sealed for years, resulting in death for 271 people and serious injury
for 800 more,46 it seems outrageous to contend, as Professor Miller did
in 1991, that assertions about the connections between protective
orders and secrecy “have been supported primarily by anecdotal
40. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.
2619, 2622–23 (1995) (analogously presenting Landes and Posner's objection to private
adjudication, which lacks precedential value, as an objection to settlements, which also lack
precedential value).
41. Id. at 2625. Luban also poses the incisive question, “Where would we be if Brown v.
Board of Education had settled quietly out of court?” Id. at 2629.
42. Id. at 2625.
43. See, e.g., Class Action Status Given to Ford and Firestone Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2001, at C4 (discussing the litigation that resulted from the unhappy combination of Ford
Explorers and Firestone tires).
44. See Miller, supra note 9, at 441. (“[T]he function of the judicial system is to resolve
private disputes, not to generate information for the public.”).
45. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979) (arguing that because public resources are being expended, litigants
relinquish their right to shield litigation-related information from the public).
46. See Class Action Status Given to Ford and Firestone Suits, supra note 43. One
commentator has recently pointed out that “it seems obvious that the secrecy agreements and
orders worked to delay the recall of these tires for years.” Koniak, supra note 36, at 785.
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evidence.”47 Furthermore, we do not allow parties to contract for
criminal activity,48 so it is irrational that courts allow parties to hide
wrongdoing that affects public health and safety behind the hermetic
seals of court-approved protective orders. Such practice is deleterious
to the egalitarian premise of any democratic form of governance.49
Out-of-court settlements, because they do not implicate the
approval of the judiciary, should perhaps remain immune to the
courts’ coercive power to prohibit sealing.50 When, however, a litigant
requests the court to approve the sealing of any record or settlement
agreement, the sealing of which would deprive the public of
knowledge of threats to its health and safety, it is incumbent upon the
court to prohibit the shrouding of such information behind the
ostensible legality of a judicial seal. By their very nature, the courts
are communal institutions,51 and even given the costs and
disincentives of a full-length trial, the judiciary cannot remain blind to
the grave consequences of concealing critical health and safety
information from the public.
In response to the argument that litigants should not be able to
piggyback on the discovery of other parties,52 one commentator has
convincingly argued that because “[t]he diseconomies of redundant
discovery ought to be avoided if possible,” discovery rules (and by
implication rules governing protective orders and court-sanctioned
settlements), “should generally obligate parties to produce discovery
materials produced in other like cases even if those cases were
47. Miller, supra note 9, at 480.
48. See Koniak, supra note 36, at 792 (posing the rhetorical question, to which Koniak
vociferously responds in the negative, “would anyone say that our courts should encourage or
allow terms in settlement contracts that provided that the parties would later cooperate in some
criminal endeavor because such terms might make the settling of some lawsuits easier?”).
49. See Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 35, at 652 (asserting that “greater access [to the
courts] strengthens democracy”).
50. For a discussion about the legitimacy of sealed out-of-court settlements, see generally
Anne-Thérèse Béchamps, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a
Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117 (1990).
51. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 40, at 2626 (making the refreshingly philosophical
argument that “legal rules and precedents are valuable not only as a source of certainty, but also
as a reasoned elaboration and visible expression of public values”). Law, in this Hegelian sense,
amounts to “the spirit of a political community manifested in a public and objective form.” Id;
see also Luban, supra note 21, at 127 (“Courts themselves are an important part of the life of a
deliberative polity like ours, and for that reason I think that the view that courts are just there
for the private convenience of the litigants is simply a false idea about courts.”).
52. Miller, supra note 9, at 441.
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resolved short of trial.”53 Indeed, if all court records (including
discovery materials) are made available to future litigants, there will
be little incentive to file frivolous lawsuits simply to gain
information.54 In fact, the costs of litigating future cases will decrease
while the settlement values of genuine claims will increase.55 Even if
one does think of the courts merely as dispute mechanisms for private
parties, it makes very little economic sense to compel every plaintiff
to bear the onus of heavy legal expenses when the information sought
has already been discovered.
As opposed to governmental bureaucracies in Europe and Japan,
which are typically responsible for extensive regulation of the private
sector,56 prosecrecy arguments often ignore the fact that American
tort law acts as a primary—if not the primary—means by which
private parties monitor and limit the behavior of other private
parties.57 If the states or the federal government were actively rooting
out and promulgating dangers to the public’s health and safety, then
the argument that any information produced in court by private
parties should generally remain secret would carry more weight. But
given the regulatory nature of American tort law,58 by which litigants
act as private attorneys general, it is illogical and unjust to shield
information from the public when that information reveals a cause of
action or substantial evidence of malfeasance.
53. Paul D. Carrington, Recent Efforts to Change Discovery Rules: Advice for Draftsmen of
Rules for State Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 456, 468 (2000).
54. But see Miller, supra note 9, at 493 (“[A] regime that has a public access presumption
and removes judicial discretion in shaping protective orders invites exploitation of the discovery
process by those primarily seeking to gather information rather than to adjudicate a dispute.”).
55. Carrington, supra note 53, at 468.
56. See, e.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective:
Prospects for Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 10 (2000):
In other industrialized countries, strong, centralized governments existed before the
rise of big business. Hence, when big business emerged in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, it adapted to the existing reality of a semi-autonomous state
deeply involved in national economic development. In France, Germany, Japan and
other countries, the state promoted industrialization and wielded extensive regulatory
powers that required the mobilization of business in the pursuit of national
objectives—economic, military, and social.
57. See, e.g., Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental
Regulation Does that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 588 (2002) (footnote
omitted) (discussing the idea that “the best explanation of tort law may be a mixed theory,
combining aspects of deterrence and corrective justice”).
58. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 143
(1995) (“Tort law . . . can encourage private accountability for the value of information to
society as a whole.”).
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Because the American legal scheme (and culture at-large) is in
many ways dependant on private parties checking the behavior of
other private parties, especially those with greater affluence and more
bargaining power, a judicial mechanism by which injured litigants can
gain access to court records without bearing gratuitous costs and by
which the public can be made aware of potential dangers to its health
and safety is essential. As it now stands, perpetual offenders can
effortlessly pay off a few informed litigants, demand a protective
order or silent settlement, and thereby gain immunity from other
affected but uninformed parties. In the absence of a presumption that
information vital to public health and safety will be universally
accessible, tort law remains an ineffective and unreliable means of
regulating the market and policing the private sector.
III.  ANTISECRECY LAWS AND THE CONTROVERSY
OVER LOCAL RULE 5.03
A. State Antisecrecy Rules and Statutes
While approximately twenty-one states have implemented laws
restricting secrecy in civil litigation,59 with the exception of the
sweeping South Carolina local rule discussed below,60 no federal
law—under the Federal Rules, judges retain the discretion to refuse
to seal a record61—poses explicit limits on secrecy. The existing state
laws restricting secrecy in litigation, moreover, do not go as far as the
rule of the South Carolina District Court, which involves a blanket
prohibition on the sealing of all court-approved settlements.62
Because South Carolina's rule is the most precautionary antisecrecy
law currently in force, this Note focuses particular attention on its
development, its positive attributes, and its shortcomings.
The two most significant and most stringent state laws involving
secrecy in litigation are those of Texas63 and Florida.64 Rule 76a of the
59. See ROSCOE POUND INST., MATERIALS OF SECRECY PRACTICES IN THE COURTS:
STATE ANTI-SECRECY MEASURES 101–03 (2000) (providing an almost comprehensive list of
state statutes and rules that limit the extent to which sealing is permissible), available at
http://www.roscoepound.org/new/00mats.pdf.
60. See infra notes 72–109 and accompanying text.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
62. S.C. LOC. R. 5.03(C).
63. See generally Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 35 (discussing and justifying Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 76a).
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Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 76a), adopted in 1990, was
intended to bolster government accountability, avert dangers to
public health and safety, and enhance confidence in the judicial
system.65 Rule 76a creates a presumption of openness to all civil court
records66 and lays out a test by which the party seeking to seal a
record must establish a specific, serious, and substantial interest that
clearly outweighs this presumption of openness and any probable
adverse effect that sealing will have upon the public’s health or
safety.67 It is then incumbent upon the judge to balance the public
interest against the interest of the party seeking secrecy.68 For the
purposes of Rule 76a, court records include all documents filed with
the court, including discovery materials and settlement agreements.69
The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act (“the Florida statute”)
also came into being in 1990, shortly after the adoption of Texas Rule
76a. Though the Florida statute was a product of the state legislature
and not the judiciary, its objectives and substantive limitations on
sealing records are very similar to those of the Texas rule. The
Florida statute, however, goes one step farther than the Texas rule by
preemptively prohibiting, without any balancing of the private and
public interest, the sealing of any information that has the purpose or
effect of concealing a public hazard or contains information that
would be useful in protecting oneself from a public hazard.70 A
“public hazard” is defined as “any instrumentality . . . that has caused
and is likely to cause injury.”71
64. See Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2002). For further
explication, see R. Bryan Morrison, Note, To Seal or Not to Seal? That Is Still the Question:
Arkansas Best Corp. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 49 ARK. L. REV. 325, 350–51 (1996) (“A
Florida court cannot enter a sealing order which conceals a public hazard or information useful
to members of the public in protecting themselves from a public hazard.”).
65. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 35, at 644.
66. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1).
67. Id.
68. Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 35, at 655–56.
69. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2).
70. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(3) (West 2002).
[N]o court shall enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of
concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard, nor shall
the court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing
any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting
themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard.
71. Id. § 69.081(2).
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B. The Promulgation of Local Rule 5.03
In the choppy wake of the Firestone tire tempest,72 the abrupt
unveiling of the Catholic Church’s child molestation scandal,73 the
public outrage over the complex Enron fiasco,74 and a series of stories
in a local newspaper about secret settlements by doctors accused of
malpractice,75 Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson Jr. of the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina, fed up with
what he perceived as the “undermining [of] public confidence in our
institutions,” announced that his court would “do the right thing” and
would attempt to restore faith in the courts.76 To that end, on July 26,
2002, Judge Anderson proposed an amendment to the Local Civil
Rules of the South Carolina District Court that would automatically
prohibit the sealing of all court-approved settlements.77 In fact, Judge
Anderson had decided that it was time to act in 1994, but at that less
propitious time, his proposal to create a presumption of universal
access to all settlement agreements filed with the court was summarily
vetoed.78
In accordance with Rule 83 of the Federal Rules, a public
commentary period was announced, so that any person could present
the court with his or her opinion on the wisdom of the proposed
amendment.79 Although the judges received thirty-four comments on
72. See Bradsher, supra note 33.
73. See Robinson, supra note 34.
74. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn & Jonathan D. Glater, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Enron
Auditor Raises Specter of Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at C1 (examining Enron’s alleged
crimes, the alleged collusion between Enron and Arthur Andersen, and the attempt to conceal
any wrongdoing). The Enron scandal did not involve a secret settlement per se, but it was
foremost in Judge Anderson’s mind when he proposed the amendment as a general indication
that the public desired less secrecy from corporations and the judiciary. See Liptak, supra note
10 (noting Judge Anderson’s intention to “‘take the lead nationally in a time when the Arthur
Andersen/Enron/Catholic priest controversies are undermining public confidence in our
institutions and causing a growing suspicion of things that are kept secret by public bodies’”).
75. See John Monk, Medical Mistakes Kept Secret, STATE (Columbia, South Carolina),
June 18, 2002, at A1 (describing the malfeasance of South Carolina “Dr. 169186,” whose
insurance company paid $9.9 million to his or her victim, and whose ineptitude was hidden from
the public by nature of a protective order); John Monk, Medical Errors Kill, Injure S.C. Patients,
STATE (Columbia, South Carolina), June 17, 2002, at A1 (describing, inter alia, a patient’s death
after obeying a doctor’s orders to take a fatal combination of drugs).
76. Liptak, supra note 10.
77. See, e.g., South Carolina Federal Court Adopts Rule that Will End Sealing of Some
Settlements, LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 26, 2002, at 2342.
78. Id.
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
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the proposed rule—some positive,80 some negative,81 some
ambivalent82—the court deemed no alterations necessary and
unanimously adopted it without revision.83 The new rule, which
dictates that “[n]o settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be
sealed pursuant to the terms of this Rule,” consequently became
effective on November 1, 2002.84
C. The Response
Because it was the most restrictive antisecrecy rule ever adopted
in American courts, South Carolina’s sweeping amendment gained
instant fame (or infamy) and elicited a national response. Indeed, the
considerable attention garnered by this mere local rule amendment85
is prima facie evidence of the rule’s uniqueness in the realm of
American civil procedure. Some commentators in the press and in
submissions to the South Carolina District Court were quick to label
the rule change as a victory for the public in its quest to learn of
potential dangers to its health and safety.86 Jeffery A. Newman, a
Massachusetts lawyer who represents victims of abuse by Catholic
80. See, e.g., Letter from Seymour Moskowitz, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University
School of Law, to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 1–4 (arguing
that the judges’ decision is supported by the current law and necessary for policy reasons),
available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
81. See, e.g., Letter from H. Mills Gallivan, President, South Carolina Defense Trial
Attorneys’ Association, to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 4
(Sept. 26, 2002) (concluding that “both the public and private interests would best be served by
upholding the continued viability of confidential agreements by leaving this matter within the
sound discretion of the Court without amendment to Local Rule 5.03”), available at
http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
82. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Zitrin, Director, Center for Applied Ethics, and Adjunct
Professor of Law, University of San Francisco, to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District
of South Carolina 1 (Sept. 26, 2002) (supporting the intention of the proposed amendment but
asserting that it fell short of enjoining mandatory disclosure for discovery documents filed with
the court), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
83. Although the rule change needed only six favorable votes to become effective, all ten
judges of the South Carolina District Court elected to enact it. Liptak, supra note 10.
84. S.C. LOC. R. 5.03(C).
85. See, e.g., Eric Frazier, Judges Veto Sealed Deals: ‘A Lot of Merit’ Discovery Is Key
Issue, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at A1 (“The vote has attracted attention across the country.”).
86. See, e.g., Don’t Keep Public in Dark, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2002, at 11A (proffering
that “[c]ourts regularly suppress information on threats to public safety” and supporting the
South Carolina amendment); Letter from The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
to Larry W. Propes, supra note 35, at 2–9 (praising Local Rule 5.03 for giving the media access
to information that the public is entitled to know).
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priests, extolled the South Carolina proposal and expressed regret at
having participated in secret settlements in early abuse cases.87
Professor Jane E. Kirtley wrote to the South Carolina court in
support of the rule change. She emphasized that “[s]ettlements often
concern matters that affect the public’s health and safety” and
concluded that the “proposed amendment to Local Rule 5.03 will
clarify that the public’s traditional presumptive right of access
prohibits secret settlements.”88
Others immediately weighed in on the court’s rule change in the
popular press and concluded that the amendment was injudicious.
Professor Arthur Miller, the longstanding and foremost apologist for
the value of secret settlements,89 responded in this manner: “‘The
judges of South Carolina, God bless them, have not evaluated the
costs of what they are proposing.’”90 He further argued that the
court’s amendment would discourage people from filing and settling
lawsuits, and would also threaten privacy and trade secret
monopolies.91 Professor Richard Epstein echoed Miller’s concern
about personal privacy and trade secrets, and he further lamented
that mandatory disclosure “will not only raise insurance rates for
guilty parties after the fact, but will also raise rates for innocent
businesses before the fact.”92
Some pundits applauded Judge Anderson’s fortitude but
criticized the tactile language of the proposed amendment to Local
Rule 5.03. Professor Stephen Gillers, for example, after noting that
“the proposal’s goals are salutary,” concluded that “greater clarity is
needed” to ensure public access to health and safety information.93
Similarly praising the spirit of the proposed amendment but
87. Liptak, supra note 10.
88. Letter from Jane E. Kirtley, Director and Silha Professor of Media Ethics and Law,
University of Minnesota, to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 4
(Sept. 24, 2002), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
89. See generally Miller, supra note 9 (arguing that the general system of allowing secret
settlements, without a burdensome showing from the party or parties seeking sealing, should be
maintained).
90. Liptak, supra note 10.
91. Id.
92. Epstein, supra note 11.
93. Letter from Stephen Gillers, Professor of Law and Vice Dean, New York University
School of Law, to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 1 (Sept. 27,
2002), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
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criticizing the rule per se, Professor Richard Zitrin wrote to the court
and characterized the amendment as a “courageous first step,” but he
pointed out that it “stops well short of including the vast majority of
settlements and the vast majority of ‘secretized’ information.”94
It is too early to report on the tangible consequences of this rule
change on litigation in the District of South Carolina. While some are
optimistic that Local Rule 5.03, as amended, will help reveal vital
health and safety information that otherwise would have remained
concealed from the public eye and will not lead to a mushrooming of
the number of cases that go to verdict,95 others insist that the
amendment will chill the filing of lawsuits in federal court and will
flood the market with embarrassing private information or valuable
trade secrets.96 The response of litigants to Local Rule 5.03, then,
perhaps the only crucial response, is yet to be determined.97
IV.  THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT SECRECY RULES
A. Texas Rule 76a and the Florida Statute
Although Texas Rule 76a, the Florida statute, and South
Carolina Local Rule 5.03 are commendable in the sense that they
attempt to remedy the ills brought about by blindly sealing records,
94. Letter from Richard Zitrin to Larry W. Propes, supra note 82, at 1.
95. Robert A. Clifford, for example, a Chicago plaintiffs’ attorney, “scoffed at the notion
that defendants would not settle without secrecy provisions, saying the alternative to a public
settlement was a far more public trial.” Liptak, supra note 10. In Florida, whose state courts
operate under a law similar to the amendment to Local Rule 5.03, Miami attorney Larry S.
Stewart declared that he had “‘not heard of a single instance where a settlement didn’t happen
because of [Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act].’” Dan Christensen, Federal Judges Ponder
Future of Secret Settlements, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Sept. 12, 2002, at A1. Amanda Frost, a
staff attorney for the Public Citizen Litigation Group, applauded the spirit of Local Rule 5.03,
but announced, on behalf of her organization, that “‘we don’t see how it’s going to be that
useful when most settlements aren’t filed with the court.’” South Carolina Federal Court Adopts
Rule that Will End Sealing of Some Settlements, supra note 77.
96. David E. Dukes, for instance, the managing partner of South Carolina’s largest law
firm, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough L.L.P., submitted a letter to Judge Anderson during
the public commentary period for Local Rule 5.03 in which he argued that “adopting any
change that would restrict the discretion of Judges to protect confidential personal and
proprietary information in civil litigation is not necessary and would be counterproductive.”
Letter from David E. Dukes, Managing Partner, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P.,
to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court, U.S. District of South Carolina 1 (Sept. 30, 2002), available
at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
97. The response of those large corporations that are routinely involved in numerous class
action and product liability suits will be especially significant.
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none of these limitations on secrecy in litigation is flawless. Texas
Rule 76a is deficient because it does not automatically prohibit the
sealing of court records that reveal substantial dangers to public
health and safety. Reasonable judges will likely utilize the rule’s
presumption of openness and the applicable balancing test to forbid
the sealing of information that reveals public health and safety
information, but Rule 76a permits judges sympathetic toward
corporations and other habitual defendants to circumvent the
admirable intent of the rule by placing an unjustified number of
weights on the private interest side of the scale.
The Florida statute is also imperfect, but for a different reason: It
fails to designate that only those harms to the public that are
substantial or are substantially likely to occur should be automatically
prohibited from being sealed. This otherwise praiseworthy attempt to
remedy the perils of court-sanctioned secrecy gives rise to the
disturbing possibility that judges may be forbidden to seal, for
example, the sensitive and embarrassing records of a reformed
alcoholic whom the court considers a public hazard because of one
isolated incident of drunken trespassing. Indeed, it may even be true
that such a trespasser has inflicted an injury and is therefore a public
hazard under the terms of the statute, but such a relatively minor,
insignificant instance of wrongdoing is not what antisecrecy laws are
meant to uncover and expose.
B. South Carolina Local Rule 5.03
Because Local Rule 5.03 is even more sweeping and
controversial than the Texas and Florida statutes, and because it is
the most proscriptive American secrecy rule, a closer analysis of its
specific deficiencies is warranted.
1. Overshooting the Mark. Local Rule 5.03(C) goes too far in
promulgating a blanket prohibition on the sealing of all court-
approved settlements.98 A sensible rule should acknowledge that
sealing is appropriate for quintessentially private information such as
trade secrets, inchoate intellectual property information, idle gossip,
settlement amounts in isolation, details of divorce proceedings, the
98. See Epstein, supra note 11 (making this very claim); see also Letter from Stephen
Gillers to Larry W. Propes, supra note 93, at 3 (arguing that Local Rule 5.03 goes too far
because “some settlement agreements contain trade secrets, purely private information, or the
settlement amount”).
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names of rape and child molestation victims, and sensitive or
embarrassing medical records, to which the public has no presumptive
right of access and no need to know.99 In this sense, Local Rule
5.03(C) is irrationally indiscriminate.  Indeed, because litigants often
have justifiable concerns about confidentiality and do not wish to
subject themselves to the garish (and often unforgiving) light of
public scrutiny, it is imperative that antisecrecy measures remain
amenable to seal when the information at issue has no bearing on the
public's health or safety.
Judge Anderson has recently reaffirmed that the rule change was
made with the intention of getting at information about dangerous
products and other material in which the public would have a
legitimate interest,100 and such an intention is deserving of praise;
regrettably, however, the concrete language of the amendment to
Local Rule 5.03 encompasses too much. Blindly prohibiting all sealing
of settlements may have the ironic effect of chilling some lawsuits that
would have alerted the public to potential dangers had they been
brought.101 It is now highly probable that parties with concerns about
privacy, especially those parties who are fearful of disclosing
embarrassing information, will decline to file for settlement in the
District of South Carolina. This situation, in turn, could lead to
docket congestion and even more delay.102
By negating any possibility for the sealing of court-filed
settlements, moreover, Local Rule 5.03 paradoxically manages to
ignore its own mandate, as promulgated by 5.03(A), that parties
seeking to file documents under seal “state the reasons why sealing is
necessary; . . . explain . . . why less drastic alternatives to sealing will
not afford adequate protection; and . . . address the factors governing
sealing of documents reflected in controlling case law.”103 Given
5.03(C)’s absolute prohibition on court-approved settlements, in fact,
it seems logically inconsistent that the South Carolina court did not
revise 5.03(A) to govern only nonsettlement records and agreements.
99. See Koniak, supra note 36, at 804–06 (providing a method for excluding universal
access to litigation-related information that does not threaten public health or safety).
100. South Carolina Federal Court Adopts Rule that Will End Sealing of Some Settlements,
supra note 77.
101. See Epstein, supra note 11.
102. The optimistic Judge Anderson, however, reports that the District of South Carolina
disposed of 3,856 civil cases in the past year, only thirty-five of which went to a verdict, and he
insists that his court has the available capacity to tackle more cases. Liptak, supra note 10.
103. S.C. LOC. R. 5.03(A).
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2. Neglect of Discovery Material. Local Rule 5.03(C) is also
deficient in the sense that it fails to prohibit the sealing of all court
records that implicate public health and safety concerns. Indeed, the
rule’s narrow focus on settlements ignores the fact that most
substantive information vital to the public domain is produced not in
settlements, but in discovery.104 As Amanda Frost, staff attorney for
the Public Citizen Litigation Group, pointed out, Local Rule 5.03
“did not go far enough” because “[t]he real issue . . . is providing the
underlying documents that are produced in discovery and contain
important information on health and safety.”105 Typically, settlements
filed with the court include only the names of the parties involved and
the amount of the settlement.106 The critical information implicating
public health and safety, in this sense, is often contained in records
that lie beyond the scope of Local Rule 5.03’s prohibition.107
Additionally, when Judge Anderson introduced the local rule
amendment, he was expressly disquieted by public health and safety
information that was being concealed in personal injury and product
liability cases; the grand majority of these claims, however, are filed in
state court and are likely to remain beyond the purview of federal
jurisdiction.108 What makes Local Rule 5.03(C) even more limited,
given its ambitious motive, is that most settlement agreements are
104. See Letter from Public Citizen Litigation Group to Larry W. Propes, Clerk of Court,
U.S. District of South Carolina 2 (Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.scd.uscourts.gov/
notices/comlr503.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
All too often, the parties obtain blanket protective orders that prohibit disclosure of
most of the documents received in discovery, and bar plaintiffs’ attorneys and their
experts from discussing the health and safety hazards they learn about through
discovery with anyone, including public officials and regulators. Eliminating secrecy
of court-filed settlements alone will not provide the public with the information about
the dangers identified in discovery.
105. South Carolina Federal Court Adopts Rule that Will End Sealing of Some Settlements,
supra note 77; see also Letter from Stephen Gillers to Larry W. Propes, supra note 93, at 3
(arguing that Local Rule 5.03(C), by including only settlements in its prohibition, did not go far
enough).
106. South Carolina Federal Court Adopts Rule that Will End Sealing of Some Settlements,
supra note 77 (noting Amanda Frost’s complaint that Local Rule 5.03 is limited because “even
when settlements are filed with the court, they usually say the case was settled for a certain
amount of money without including any underlying health and safety information”).
107. Letter from Public Citizen Litigation Group to Larry W. Propes, supra note 104, at 2.
108. Liptak, supra note 10.
SANSON.DOC 06/21/04 4:02 PM
2003] COURT-SANCTIONED SECRECY 827
negotiated out of court,109 so information contained within them
remains outside the reach of this rule.
V.  THE NEED FOR REFORM AND A MEANS OF EFFECTING IT
A. The Justification
In most jurisdictions, and especially in federal court, it has
become far too easy for judges to robotically seal a document when
both parties are asking the court to do so.110 Various state antisecrecy
rules and the District of South Carolina’s Local Rule 5.03, the
strictest federal antisecrecy law, have been adopted to remedy this
problem, but as discussed above,111 these rules and statutes have noble
aims but suffer from textual deficiencies. It seems, in this light, that
extensive reform is exigent; the welfare of the body politic and the
very integrity of the American judiciary are at stake.
While some have proposed addressing concerns about court-
sanctioned secrecy by means of an ethical regulation, such an
approach is not the ideal solution. An ethics rules amendment that
forbids lawyers from taking part in agreements that restrict the
public’s access to health and safety information112 might precipitate a
welcome philosophical transformation in the way in which attorneys
regard their professional responsibilities, but it seems more just (and
pragmatic) to impose the burden of recognizing public hazards on
judges, who, unlike lawyers in their representation of clients, are
expected to be impartial. Indeed, it would seem incongruous to have
one ethics rule that obliges a lawyer to do what is in the best interest
of his or her client113 and another rule that prohibits the lawyer from
negotiating a confidential settlement that would in fact be in the best
interest of his or her client.114 If an ethics rule alone is meant to solve
109. See South Carolina Federal Court Adopts Rule that Will End Sealing of Some
Settlements, supra note 77 (noting Amanda Frost’s additional complaint that Local Rule 5.03 is
shortsighted because “[s]ettlements are frequently not filed with the court because the parties
settle and the stipulation is a dismissal”).
110. See Weinstein, supra note 4, at 58.
111. See supra Part IV.
112. See, e.g., Zitrin, supra note 4, at 116–17 (proposing such a change).
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2003) (“A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”); see also Weinstein, supra note
4, at 63 (noting that there is an “ethical obligation to maximize the client’s benefit”).
114. See Luban, supra note 21, at 127–29 (rejecting Zitrin’s model rule for
analogous reasons).
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the problem of public health and safety measures being concealed
under seal, moreover, it appears almost ineluctable, given the devil-
take-the-hindmost ethos that pervades contemporary legal culture,
that the rule would be ignored in the interest of the client, leaving
public health and safety hazards buried.115
B. The Proposal
What is instead needed is sweeping antisecrecy reform that gives
rise to objective procedural standards. As highlighted above, the
Texas, Florida, and South Carolina laws have admirable
characteristics and purposes, but each suffers from substantive
deficiencies and distinct jurisdictional limitations. As such, given the
limited scope and small number of antisecrecy laws, the American
court system continues to act as a multi-tiered mechanism by which
offending parties can easily frustrate victims’ legitimate claims by
hiding vital information in court-created vaults. Ultimately, it is
irrelevant (and impossible to discern empirically) how often critical
health and safety information is thrust into such vaults; what is
significant is that the judiciary, in light of its permissive attitude
toward secrecy and its myopic pursuit of lawsuit termination,
implicitly sanctions the victimization of the public and effectively
champions the party who can afford to purchase concealment.
Ideally, then, in order to implement national reform and to cure
the ills of current antisecrecy laws, the Supreme Court should amend
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as follows:
No settlement agreement or record introduced in federal court, 
including records obtained through discovery, will be sealed if 
the settlement agreement or record includes information that (1) 
reveals liability for a prior and substantial physical or financial
injury or (2) reveals a substantial risk of physical or financial 
injury to any person.116
115. See id. at 128–29 (arguing that an ethics rule is “difficult to apply” and “probably would
not be used much by lawyers in mass exposure or mass accident cases because the lawyer still
has client-based and personal incentives to negotiate the secret settlement, which is after all a
windfall for that client”).
116. Cf. Letter from Stephen Gillers to Larry W. Propes, supra note 93, at 3. Professor
Gillers proposes the following amendment to Local Rule 5.03:
No settlement agreement will be sealed except pursuant to the procedures
described in this rule and in Ashcroft and other precedent. No document contained in
the Court file, including a settlement agreement, will be sealed if the document
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If the Supreme Court fails to make such a change, it would then
be necessary for the federal district courts, in the same manner that
the South Carolina District Court amended Local Rule 5.03, to adopt
this proposal as a local rule of procedure. Such method of
implementation may not catalyze immediate, organic change, but in
the absence of an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, it would at least heighten national consciousness about the
perils of court-approved secrecy. At the same time, in order to
engender far-reaching reform, state legislatures or state courts should
formulate statutes or rules that embrace the language of this
proposed amendment.
This proposal retains the commendable spirit of openness of the
existing antisecrecy rules and also remedies their insufficiencies. Like
the Texas, Florida, and South Carolina laws, the instant proposal has
the objective of prohibiting the routine sealing of settlements and
records that contain information crucial to the public’s health and
safety. Unlike Texas Rule 76a, however, which presents a balancing
test and still grants the court some discretion regarding the choice to
seal, this proposed amendment creates an absolute ban on the sealing
of any court-approved settlement or record that reveals substantial
risks to the public’s health and safety. By replacing the Texas
balancing test with a clear prohibition against sealing relevant records
and settlement agreements, this proposal allows far less wiggle room
for judges biased in favor of particular defendants or indifferent to
the effect of judicial decisions on nonparties. This proposal’s
unqualified prohibition on the sealing of critical health and safety
information, furthermore, gives appellate courts much clearer
guidance when reviewing lower court decisions.
The instant proposal is also superior to the Florida statute
because it includes a magnitude component. Unlike the Florida
statute, which potentially prohibits secrecy (depending on the
discretion of the judge) for even the most minor injuries or threats to
contains information that (1) reveals a significant risk of physical or financial injury to
any person or (2) tends to prove the liability of any person for physical or financial
injury already suffered. No confidentiality promise will be “so ordered” if it purports
to protect such information.
Id. Gillers’ inclusion of confidentiality orders in his model rule is a wise one; this Note, however,
is limited to an analysis of the sealing of court-filed records. For a discussion of contractually
binding confidentiality promises in settlements, see generally Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil:
Settlement Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1 (2002).
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the public, this proposed amendment mandates that the injuries or
threats must be substantial before secrecy is entirely forbidden.
Undoubtedly, and laudably, the Florida legislature intended to
discourage litigants from using the court system as a means of evading
liability for serious injuries they have already perpetrated or are likely
to perpetrate, but by rendering such a broadly worded statute, the
Florida legislators missed their mark. By explicitly delineating that
the injury or risk of injury must be substantial before sealing is
prohibited, this suggested amendment preserves the right of litigants
to keep private minor indiscretions and focuses the court’s attention
on those violations that affect the public in a significant manner.
Unlike Local Rule 5.03’s categorical ban on all court-sanctioned
settlements, moreover, this proposal allows for secret settlements
when the public’s health or safety is not in jeopardy. Truly private
information that has no rational bearing on the public welfare—trade
secrets, the names of rape victims, confidential medical records,
immaterial financial data, and so forth—will remain private if one of
the parties requests that such information be filed under seal or if the
court seals such information sua sponte. Indeed, because keeping
one’s personal life private is so central to the prosecrecy argument, it
is important to note that this proposal recognizes the right of
individuals to be free from undue embarrassment and any other harm
that could arise from the release of information that is irrelevant to
the public’s health and safety. By balancing the public interest versus
the private interest, then, this proposed rule rectifies the inflexible,
blanket prohibition of Local Rule 5.03 and reintroduces a
discretionary component in the determination of what information
“reveals liability” and what constitutes a “substantial” prior injury or
risk of injury. Hopefully judges would exercise that discretion
prudently, with the aims of the proposal in mind.117
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, this proposal
ameliorates Local Rule 5.03 by regulating discovery records, not just
settlement agreements, that are introduced in court. Because the most
important information that concerns the public's health and safety is
typically omitted from settlement agreements, it is imperative that
antisecrecy rules govern all court records, including discovery. In this
117. See, e.g., Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?—The Need for a Clearer Judicial
Role in Settlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 66 (1994) (noting that critics of judicial involvement in
settlement argue that it may be difficult for judges to maintain their neutrality throughout
a case).
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sense, unlike Local Rule 5.03, this proposal further ensures that
future plaintiffs, especially those with legitimate claims against deep-
pocketed corporate defendants, will not have to bear the significant
costs of discovery over and over again in subsequent litigation.118
It is patently Kafkaesque that discovery records which manifest
evidence of wrongdoing perennially pass from one case to the next as
courts fasten blinders on past and future victims. In order to preserve
the integrity of the judiciary and to reduce litigation costs, discovery
records that reveal substantial injuries and substantial risks of injury
should be treated exactly like settlement agreements that attempt to
conceal evidence of chicanery. Unlike the limited settlement
provision of Local Rule 5.03, this proposal recognizes that regardless
of its form or timing of its appearance before the court, the judiciary
must never act as a willing participant in the suppression of
information vital to the public’s health and safety.
Finally, it must be emphasized that this proposal does not
impinge on out-of-court settlements: Litigants would be free to
negotiate confidential settlement agreements outside the confines of
the courtroom. When parties step into a public forum and ask the
court to seal a record that reveals hazards to the public, however,
regardless of whether the party seeking the protective order is a
plaintiff or defendant, it is antithetical to the very fabric of a
democratic system to allow courts to act as black holes from which
evidence of misconduct cannot escape.
CONCLUSION
Despite the best arguments of those who justify the customary
granting of protective orders on the grounds of economic efficiency
and the limited capacities of the dockets, it has become apparent that
blindly sealing court records without regard to legitimate public
interests has undesirable and sometimes tragic consequences. When
courts act, as they habitually do, as active agents in the suppression of
information that could otherwise save lives, the integrity of the
judicial system must be called into question.
The spirit of the recent amendment to South Carolina Local
Rule 5.03, the most restrictive antisecrecy measure in any jurisdiction,
is brave indeed in its effort to expose threats to the public's health
and safety, but the rule remains substantively flawed. It misses its
118. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
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mark by potentially divulging private information that does not
implicate public health and safety matters, and it neglects to take into
account the public’s presumption of access to vital health and safety
information uncovered in discovery. State antisecrecy laws, including
those of Texas and Florida, are also admirable, but they are either too
lenient or too stringent to strike a delicate balance between the
public’s presumption of access to court records and the litigant’s right
to privacy.
The exigency of national reform, in both state and federal court,
is clear. Ideally, the Federal Rules, along with parallel state rules of
procedure, should be amended to automatically prohibit the sealing
of any court record that reveals liability for a prior and substantial
physical or financial injury, or reveals a substantial risk of physical or
financial injury to any person. The adoption of the rule proposed in
this Note, like any other, may not be perfect; it would, however, go a
long way toward remedying the antidemocratic pestilence of court-
sanctioned secrecy that currently plagues the judiciary.
